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I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in medical science and the exigent search for means by
which infertile couples' may participate in the joys of parenting have
spurred an increasing use of new reproductive technologies. 2 Among
these methodologies are in vitro fertilization (IVF),3 artificial insemina-
tion,4 surrogate motherhood,5 egg donation,6 artificial embryona-
Approximately one out of every ten couples of childbearing age in the United States
is infertile. W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 121 (2d ed. 1976).
2 See infra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. Louise Joy Brown, the first test-tube
baby, was born to Lesley Brown in England on July 25, 1978. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1982,
§ 4, at 22, col. 1. For a discussion of how the first test-tube baby was conceived and born, by
the two scientists who developed the technique, see R. EDWARDS & P. STEPTOE, A MATTER OF
LIFE (1980). Since 1978, numerous children throughout the world have been conceived using
these new reproductive technologies. France's first test-tube baby was born on February 25,
1982. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at 16, col. 6. The world's first test-tube quadruplets were
born in Australia on January 6, 1984. Id., Jan. 6, 1984, at 2, col. 3. The first baby conceived
via embryo transfer technique was born in the United States on February 3, 1984. Id., Feb.
4, 1984, § 1, at 6, col. 1, Australia witnessed the first baby born of a frozen embryo on April
10, 1984. Id., Apr. 11, 1984, § 1, at 16, col. 4. To illustrate the breadth of the advances in the
new methods of procreation, it has been reported that Dr. Cecil Jacobsen at the George
Washington University Medical School has fertilized a chimpanzee egg in vitro with
chimpanzee sperm and implanted the fertilized egg into the abdomen of a male chimpanzee
who later delivered a healthy baby chimpanzee by Caeserean section. L. ANDREWS, NEW
CONCEPTIONS 261 (1984).
2 In vitro is defined: "In an artificial environment, referring to a process or reaction
occurring therein, as in a test tube or culture media." STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 723 (5th
unabr. lawyer's ed. 1982). In IVF, the physician performs a minor operation on the wife in
order to remove an egg from her ovary, and places it in a shallow dish (hence, the term
"test-tube baby") containing a special medium and sperm. If the egg is fertilized, the
physician then implants the fertilized egg (embryo, for the purposes of this Note) back into
the womb of the mother. L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 5. For a more comprehensive
description of the IVF procedure, see Edwards & Fowler, Human Embryos in the Labora-
tory, 223 ScI. AM. 44 (1970).
4 In artificial insemination, the woman visits her physician when she is about to
ovulate. Assuming the position for a pelvic examination, the physician implants sperm into
the vagina, either via a syringe, injecting the sperm near the cervix, or by inserting sperm
into a diaphragm-like cervical cap which the woman will wear for the following four to six
hours. L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 5.
' For women who cannot conceive or carry a child for one of any number of reasons,
another woman, a surrogate mother, agrees to be inseminated with the sperm of the
husband to carry the baby to term. Id. at 6. Although this is the typical surrogate mother
arrangement, it can take various forms: 1) the surrogate can be artificially inseminated
with anonymous donor sperm; 2) the wife's egg can be fertilized by her husband's sperm in
vitro and, once fertilized, implanted into the surrogate; or 3) the wife's egg can be fertilized
by her husband's sperm in the conventional manner and, once fertilized, the egg will be
flushed out and then implanted into the surrogate.
' In this technique, a microscopic egg of a woman donor is transferred into a woman
who cannot produce her own egg or whose egg cannot travel to the uterus. It is the hope of
the childless couple that once the egg is implanted inside the woman, it will be fertilized by
the husband's sperm through natural intercourse. Id.
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tion,7 and embryo adoption.8 The popularity of these technologies9
however, has prompted a myriad of legal and ethical problems.10 Coupled
with the virtual lack of legislation in these areas,1 1 the problems are a
reality. Furthermore, the existing, albeit scant, case law pertaining to
the utilization of these new modes of reproduction sheds no light on the
future resolution of the legal problems that will arise as these technolo-
gies continue to be employed. 12
It seems inevitable that new causes of action will evolve as more
childless couples resort to the use of the new reproductive methodologies.
The prenatal tort claims abounding in precedent today lay a firm
foundation for the recognition of a new form of tort liability. In light of
the inapplicability of the parent-child immunity doctrine, tort liability
' In artificial embryonation, the husband and wife utilize a fertile woman who agrees
to be inseminated with the husband's sperm. Four to five days after fertilization, the
physician flushes out the embryo and implants it into the wife, who will then carry the baby
to term. Id.
s If the woman has an ovarian or tubal problem and the husband is sterile, another
woman is voluntarily inseminated by the sperm of a donor. Once fertilized, the embryo is
flushed out after five days and implanted into the wife for normal maturation and birth. In
embryo adoption, unlike egg donation or artificial insemination, the embryo has genes from
neither parent. Id. at 7. For purposes of simplicity in this Note, egg donation, embryonation,
and embryo adoption will be categorized as embryo transfer (ET).
9 Test-tube baby clinics are becoming increasingly available. At least two such clinics
exist in England, five in Australia, and others in Italy, France, Sweden, and Germany. L.
ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 124-25. A list of centers in the United States offering IVF, ET and
surrogate mother programs can be found id. at 311-18 app. E.
'o A selection of law review articles discussing the ethical and legal problems presented
by IVF, ET, artificial insemination, and surrogate motherhood can be found in L. ANDREWS,
supra note 2, at 298-310 app. D.
" The only semblance of federal statutory law governing any of the new reproductive
technologies is the HEW report regarding research involving human IVF and ET. Ethics
Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report and Conclu-
sions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human in Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,034 (1979). Currently, only two state IVF statutes exist. L.
ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 297 app. D. Most existing state legislation in this area deals with
fetal research which may affect IVF, ET, or embryo freezing. See id. at 297-98 app. D. for
a complete listing. For a list of state statutes governing artificial insemination, see id. at
300-01 app. D. To date, there exists no state legislation dealing with surrogate motherhood,
although a few states are considering such laws. E.g., 10 (Legislative Notes) FAs. L. REP.
(BNA) No. 20, at 1273 (Mar. 20, 1984)(HB 1595, Maryland, would sanction surrogate
parenthood arrangements under certain conditions, setting forth provisions which must be
incorporated into a surrogate parenthood agreement). There are, however, laws governing
a process which affects surrogate mother contracts, namely, statutes that prohibit payment
in connection with adoption. L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 303 app. D. Adoption law plays a
dominant role in typical surrogate motherhood arrangements because the contracting
mother must legally adopt the child after the surrogate mother gives birth and turns the
baby over to her. Id. at 226-33.
12 An inventory of case law pertaining to surrogate motherhood, IVF, and artificial
insemination is contained in L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 302-03 app. D.
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predicated on the surrogate motherhood arrangement may permit an
infant born with mental infirmities or physical abnormalities to recover
damages from the surrogate for the injuries caused as a result of the
surrogate's inadequate prenatal care.
This Note will first examine briefly the history of prenatal torts, and
present the status of recovery today. The Note will then examine the
history and current status of the doctrine of parent-child immunity in the
United States. Concentrating on these two concepts, the nature of a tort
claim by an injured child for prenatal injuries proximately caused by the
surrogate mother's negligent conduct, based upon medical evidence of the
effects of inadequate prenatal care on the health of the developing fetus,
will be investigated. It will be suggested that the imposition of liability
on the negligent surrogate mother is the only just and fair method by
which an infant may seek redress for its injuries.
II. PRENATAL TORT LIABILITY
A. History of Prenatal Tort Liability
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in
every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as
an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. 13
The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation. 14
Consonant with this view of the inherent importance of life and the
preservation of one's mental and physical faculties, modern courts have
afforded relief to injured plaintiffs for prenatal torts 15 proximately caused
'3 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
14 Id.
" Prenatal injuries are those injuries sustained by the plaintiff-child while en centre so
mere (in the womb of the mother). Often synonymously classified as prenatal tort claims are
actions for wrongful life and wrongful birth. Wrongful life actions are brought by an
unplanned child seeking recovery for injuries sustained because of negligent failure to
prevent its birth. The claims are generally disfavored by the courts based on the view that
an impaired life is better than no life at all. For a discussion of wrongful life claims, see
generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 370-73
(5th ed. 1984); Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1409 (1977); Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513
(1966), reprinted in 7 J. Fu. L. 465 (1967); Note, Child v. Parent: A Viable New Tort of
Wrongful Life?, 24 ARtz. L. REV. 391 (1982); Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be
Born, 54 TuL. L. REV. 480 (1980).
Wrongful birth claims have been asserted by the parents of an unplanned child based on
the negligence of a doctor or hospital in failing to disclose or to warn the parents of genetic
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by the wrongdoing of another. However, the stream of judicial decisions
recognizing the extension of tort liability to encompass injuries to an
unborn child has traced a turbulent course of acceptance.
1. Early Cases
Recovery for prenatal injuries was first considered in Dietrich v.
Northampton.16 In Dietrich, the mother of the deceased child, when
approximately four to five months pregnant, slipped on a defect in the
highway and fell, resulting in a miscarriage. 17 The court held that there
is no cause of action for injuries sustained in utero'8 because the fetus is
a part of the mother1 9 and no duty is owed to one not yet in being.20 The
court further asserted that the child, "although not directly injured,
unless by a communication of the shock to the mother, was too little
advanced in foetal life to survive its premature birth."2' The focus of this
decision appeared to be the point of viability22 of the fetus.
In accord with Dietrich, the court in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital23 held
that an infant cannot maintain a cause of action for injuries received
before birth.24 In Allaire, both the mother and the unborn child received
physical injuries as the result of an elevator accident in the hospital
disease, or where abortions or sterilization have failed or there has been a negligent
prescription of drugs that failed to prevent pregnancy. For a discussion of wrongful birth
claims, see generally W. PROSSER & W. KEErON, supra; Rogers, Wrongful Life & Wrongful
Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713
(1982); Note, Wrongful Birth and Emotional Distress Damages: A Suggested Approach, 38
U. Prmr. L. REV. 550 (1977); Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes ofAction-
Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611 (1980).
The common thread running throughout these tort actions is the recognition of injuries
sustained while in the womb of the mother. However, injury to the child is not a requisite
to institute a wrongful birth action. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971) (harm caused to mother by pharmacist's breach of duty in negligently refilling oral
contraceptive prescription with tranquilizers).
" 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
17 Id.
is Id. at 15. In utero is defined as: "Within the uterus; not yet born." BLAKISTON's GOULD
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 697 (4th ed. 1979).
1" Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17.
20 Id. at 16.
21 Id. at 15.
22 Viability is the "[c]apability of living." It usually connotes a fetus that has reached
500 grams in weight and 20 gestational weeks, a stage at which a fetus is "sufficiently
developed to live outside of the uterus." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1556 (5th unabr.
lawyer's ed. 1982).
23 184 111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (per curiam) (overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill.
422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953)).
24 Id.
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where the mother was due to give birth.25 In support of its holding, the
court asserted that the child has no existence apart from its mother.26  It
maintained that the fetus is not a person and that the child is severed
from its mother only upon birth.27 It further stated that injury resulted
to the mother, not to the plaintiff-child. The court also considered the lack
of precedent affording relief, under such circumstances, to be a major
factor in its decision denying the plaintiff-child redress for its injuries. 28
The court declared that if the action were maintained, the natural
consequence would be for the infant to sue the mother for injuries
sustained by the negligence of the mother while pregnant. 29
In Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,30 the court relied on
Dietrich and Allaire in holding that a representative of a deceased child
may not maintain a cause of action for prenatal injuries.3 1 In Stanford,
the pregnant mother was injured owing to the defendant-railroad's
negligence while she was descending from a train, resulting in the
premature birth and subsequent death of the child. 32 While the court
acknowledged that "a legal personality is imputed to an unborn child as
a rule of property for all purposes beneficial to the infant at birth but not
for purposes working to its detriment," it determined that, in agreement
with Dietrich, the damage to the unborn child was too remote to be
compensated.33  The court also emphasized the reasoning in Allaire, that
a child is a part of the mother before birth and is severed from her at
birth, thus precluding recovery for injuries sustained while in the womb
of the mother.34
25 Id. at 360, 56 N.E. at 638.
26 Id. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. In contrast, it is the objective of this Note to lay a foundation for recovery of
injuries sustained in utero by the child of a surrogate motherhood arrangement.
In Allaire, Justice Boggs, dissenting, asserted that precedents are only guides-that they
should not be viewed as the sole factor in shaping the law. Id. Acknowledging that the
common law recognizes that life begins when an infant "is able to stir in the mother's
womb," and that an individual can be convicted of murder if he unlawfully beats a pregnant
woman, causing not only the mother to die, but also the infant to die shortly after birth, he
deduced that the child should be able to recover if injured but survives. Id. at 371-72, 56
N.E. at 641. Justice Boggs believed that "natural justice" dictates that a child should be able
to institute a claim for injuries sustained while in the womb of the mother. Id. at 374, 56
N.E. at 642.





34 Id. at 612, 108 So. at 567.
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In Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,35 the court held that
damages could not be recovered for the death of a child caused by
negligently-inflicted prenatal injuries.3 6 In this case, a truck struck the
mother's automobile, causing it to collide with a parked automobile. The
mother was crushed against the steering wheel and other parts of the car,
causing the premature birth of twins, one of whom died nineteen days
later as a result of the prenatal injuries sustained as a result of the
accident.37 In denying recovery, the court reasoned that the decisions
protecting an unborn child in property rights "do not support the
imposition of liability upon others for torts indirectly committed against
a prospective human being, one unseen and unknown, and who may
never have an independent existence." 38 It pointed to the inability at that
time to draw the "line" between viability and non-viability.39 The court
further contended that no duty is owed to an unborn child, apart from the
duty to avoid harming the mother.40 The refusal to recognize a cause of
action for prenatal injuries was also prompted by the alleged impossibil-
ity of establishing a causal link between the death or condition of the
child and the injury, except via speculation or conjecture. 41
The basic reasons advanced by these and other early judicial decisions
for precluding recovery by a child, or its representative, for negligently-
inflicted prenatal injuries were: 1) lack of precedent,42 2) absence of duty
toward the unborn child, 43 3) difficulty in proving causation, 44 4) fear of
fictitious or fraudulent claims,45 or 5) fear of a child being able to
maintain an action against its mother for injuries resulting from her
negligence while pregnant.46
2. The Turning Point
In 1939, however, Scott v. McPheeters,47 the first case to allow recovery
for prenatal injuries, laid the foundation for this new breed of tort
" 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935) (overruled by Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand and Gravel,
Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967)).
36 Id.
37 id.
31 Id. at 357, 78 S.W.2d at 948.
39 Id. at 359, 78 S.W.2d at 949.
40 Id. at 360, 78 S.W.2d at 950.
41 Id.
42 E.g., Allaire, 184 Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
43 E.g., Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 223, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921) (overruled by
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)).
4' E.g., Jordan, 124 Tex. at 360, 78 S.W.2d at 950.
45 id.
46 E.g., Allaire, 184 Il. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
47 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, affd per curiam, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 93 P.2d 562
(1939),
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liability. The prenatal injury sustained in this case originated from the
physician's negligent use of metal clamps and forceps in the process of
delivering the child from its mother's womb, causing permanent
paralysis.4 The court found the infant's viability at the time of injury to
be a key factor in permitting recovery. 49 In light of the possibility that the
child may have been able to exist apart from its mother at the time of
injury, the court asserted that "[t]he difficulty of obtaining proof of the
wrong should prompt greater leniency in affording the remedy, rather
than a denial of plain justice .... Law is progressive and should lend its
aid to secure justice rather than to block it."50 The court further
recognized that the law should attempt to keep pace with the develop-
ments of science and the ever-changing conditions of the world. 5 '
A further step toward acknowledging a cause of action for prenatal
injuries was taken in Bonbrest v. Kotz.52 This case was the first to
consider viability in ascertaining whether recovery can be afforded to an
unborn, viable child who sustained injuries while in its mother's womb.
In Bonbrest, the child was injured by the physician's negligence during
delivery.53 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a
viable child, while dependent upon its mother for its continued nourish-
ment and growth, is not a "part" of the mother and is capable of
extrauterine life. 54 The court was cognizant of civil and property law
which regarded a child en ventre sa mere as a human being from the
moment of conception5- and declared that it is a "natural justice" to allow
a child, if born alive and viable, to maintain a cause of action for injuries
wrongfully committed while in utero.5 6 The court reasoned that:
[t]he absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who by
their wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the right of an
individual. . . .And what right is more inherent, and more
sacrosanct, than that of the individual in his possession and
enjoyment of his life, limbs and his body?5 7
48 Id. at 630, 92 P.2d at 679.
41 Id. at 636, 92 P.2d at 681-82.
50 Id. at 637, 92 P.2d at 682-83.
51 id. at 637, 92 P.2d at 683. "Precedents are valuable so long as they do not obstruct or
destroy progress." Id.
12 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
53 Id. at 139.
54 Id. at 140.
55 Id.
r6 Id. at 142.
17 Id. The court was concerned with the right of the individual, not with the possibility
of other causes of action being brought in bad faith or with difficulties of proof. Id.
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Although Bonbrest recognized viability as the pivotal factor in permit-
ting recovery, Kelly v. Gregory58 extended the scope of recovery to
nonviable fetuses. In this case, an automobile struck and knocked down
an expectant mother, causing prenatal injuries to the three month old
fetus.59 The court held that a child born alive is entitled to relief for
prenatal injuries sustained any time after conception as the result of
another's negligent conduct. 6o It reasoned that legal separability should
begin where there is a biological separability. 61 The court noted that
knowledge about the actual process of conception and fetal development
is greater now than when some of the earlier common law cases, which
refused recovery to nonviable fetuses, were decided.62 This contention
was supported by the court's observation that a mother's biological
contribution from conception is nourishment and protection but that the
fetus has a separate existence. The fact that the fetus cannot survive if
the nourishment and protection are severed before the point of viability
does not obliterate the separability; it merely describes the "conditions
under which life will not continue."63 Hence, Kelly set forth the proposi-
tion that viability is no longer the standard for determining recovery for
prenatal injuries.
Countering the early courts' reasons for denying recovery, subsequent
courts have recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries because: 1)
courts have acknowledged that the fetus has a separate existence from
the mother;64 2) the law recognizes the separate existence of an unborn
child for the purpose of protecting property rights and protecting it from
criminal conduct; 65 3) the wrong caused by the negligence of another
58 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 543, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697. See infra note 64.
62 Kelly, 282 A.D. at 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
63 Id.
14 E.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951). "Separate
existence" can be best explained by the following excerpt.
While it is a fact that there is a close dependence by the unborn child on the
organism of the mother, it is not disputed today that the mother and the child are
two separate and distinct entities; that the unborn child has its own system of
circulation of the blood separate and apart from the mother; that there is no
communication between the two circulation systems; that the heart beat of the
child is not in tune with that of the mother but is more rapid; that there is no
dependence by the child on the mother except for sustenance. It might be
remarked here that even after birth the child depends for sustenance upon the
mother or upon a third party. It is not the fact that an unborn child is part of the
mother, but that rather in the unborn state it lived with the mother, we might
say, and from conception on developed its own distinct, separate personality.
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 466, 26 A.2d 684, 687 (1942) (Brogan, J., dissenting)
(overruled by Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960)).
65 E.g., Amann v. Faidy, 415 111. 422, 429, 114 N.E.2d 412, 416 (1953).
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warrants remedy;66 4) lack of precedent should not be a bar to recovery
where a wrong has been committed;67 and 5) fear of fraudulent claims and
difficulty of proof should not deny a cause of action to one injured by
another's negligent conduct. 68
B. Present Status for Recovery
These early cases formed the impetus for the recognition of liability for
prenatal injuries. Every American jurisdiction today allows an injured
child subsequently born alive, regardless of viability at the time of injury,
to recover for damages sustained by another's negligence while en ventre
sa mere.69 One problem remains for which there is, as yet, no complete
agreement. Some jurisdictions allowing recovery have been presented
with cases that involved only fetuses which were viable at the time the
injury occurred. These courts, however, have stated in dictum that
recovery must be limited to such cases. When actually confronted with
the issue, however, almost all of the jurisdictions have permitted recovery
even though the fetus was only a few weeks old.7 0 The courts' lack of
consensus poses little threat to an infant's right of action.
The prevalent recognition of claims for prenatal injuries sets the stage
for an infant to obtain redress for prenatal injuries resulting from the
utilization of surrogate motherhood arrangements.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
A. A Historical Perspective of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine in
the United States
Abrogation of parent-child immunity has gained widespread accep-
tance in American jurisdictions. This immunity rule denies a minor child
6 E.g., Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958).
67 E.g., Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1226, 258 S.W.2d 577, 579 (1953).
65 E.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 366, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
9 E.g., Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (1977); Daley v. Meier, 33
Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). For a more expansive listing and discussion of
liability for prenatal injuries, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, at 367;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979 & App., Reporter's Note 1982); Gordon, The
Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579 (1965); Note, Tort Recovery for the Unborn Child, 15
J. FAm. L. 276 (1976-77); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962).
Courts have also permitted parents to recover in a wrongful death action if the child was
born alive and subsequently died as a result of the original injury. E.g., Porter v. Lassiter,
91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304
N.E.2d 88 (1973). Contra, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz
v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969). For a discussion of
wrongful death cases, see generally Note, Tort Recovery for the Unborn Child, 15 J. FAM. L.
276 (1976-1977); Note, Recovery for Tortious Death of the Unborn, 33 S.C.L. REV. 797 (1982);
Note, Torts-Wrongful Death-Recovery for Wrongful Death of a Stillborn Fetus Examined,
21 VILL. L. REV. 994 (1976).
71 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, at 368.
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a cause of action for personal injuries inflicted by its parents. 71 The
recognition of parent-child tort liability, however, is not free from
limitations and has incurred numerous obstacles on its journey through
the judicial system. An examination of its history and current status will
assist the reader in understanding its inapplicability to the surrogate
mother arrangement.
1. "The Great Trilogy"
The "great trilogy" of cases established the rule of parent-child immu-
nity: Hewlettete v. George,72 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 73 and Roller v.
Roller.74 The pinnacle case questioning the sanction of parental authority
vis-a-vis injuries to an unemancipated child caused by the parent's
negligence appeared in the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1891. In
Hewlettete v. George, the court held:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.7 5
The court's decision was devoid of both judicial precedent and reason-
ing; it merely determined that an action for false imprisonment did not
lie against the parent in order to preserve family harmony.7 6
Relying heavily on Hewlettette, the court in McKelvey v. McKelvey
denied recovery by a minor child against her father and stepmother for
cruel and inhuman treatment on the basis of preservation of family
harmony.77 But the McKelvey court went further; it also recognized a
common law right of the father to control and chastise his child.78
Moreover, the court analogized parent-child immunity to interspousal
immunity, proclaiming in dicta, under the interspousal immunity doc-
trine, that neither husband nor wife can maintain an action against the
other for wrongs occurring during their marriage, by virtue of the rights
and duties arising from the marital relation itself.
7 9
In Roller v. Roller, the disruption of family harmony and parental
discipline was an invalid argument for denying recovery to a daughter for
7' Id. § 122, at 904.
72 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
71 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
7' 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
75 Hewlettette, 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
76 Id. In this case the daughter was wrongfully confined in an insane asylum.
7' McKelvey, 111 Tenn. at 388, 77 S.W. at 664.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 389, 77 S.W. at 665.
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the rape committed against her by her father because the family unit had
already dissolved. 80 The Roller court was compelled to analogize parent-
child immunity to interspousal immunity but also proffered the argu-
ment that if liability were found, the parent might reacquire the child's
tort damages, should the child predecease the parent. 81 Permitting this
action would tend to allow a tortfeasor to profit from his wrong. The court
also contended that the public has an interest in the financial well-being
of the minor members of the family unit, and reasoned that affording
recovery to an injured child could deplete the parent's assets which would
otherwise be available to the plaintiffs siblings.8 2 This veil of immunity,
however, has been pierced with exceptions as an increasing number of
parent-child tort actions have confronted the judiciary.8 3
2. Exceptions to the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine
Although the courts generally adhere to the parent-child immunity
rule barring negligence actions brought by an unemancipated child
against its parent, they have recognized that the doctrine is inapplicable
under certain circumstances. The exceptions consist of the following:
a) when the family relationship no longer exists (e.g., when the child is
emancipated)8 4 or has been temporarily abandoned (e.g., when the parent
tortiously injures the child, intentionally, wantonly, or, in some jurisdic-
tions, with gross negligence);85
b) in actions arising in motor vehicle negligence cases, where the
injuries were caused by the parent's negligent driving;8 6
80 Roller, 37 Wash. at 243, 79 P. at 789.
81 Id.
82 Id. Other justifications for parent-child immunity often advanced by the courts are: 1)
maintenance of parental discipline and control, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584,
118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923); and 2) fear of fraud and collusion between family members, e.g.,
Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1968). The latter justification,
however, merits little weight since an emancipated child may have more of an incentive to
develop a scheme by which to recover tort damages. Moreover, an argument can be made
that permitting such suits would not destroy family harmony and tranquility since
harmony is disrupted when the tort occurs. E.g., Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 488,
462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1969).
83 A good evaluation of the "great trilogy" of cases can be found in Hollister, Parent-
Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 489 (1982).
' E.g., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal- 2d 244, 288 P2d 868 (1955); Logan v.
Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962).
" E.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282,
218 P.2d 445 (1950)(en banc).
s E.g., Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972); Triplett v. Triplett, 34 N.C.
App. 212, 237 S.E.2d 546 (1977).
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c) where the parental tortfeasor's negligence resulted in the death of a
party or parties;87
d) where the parent's negligent conduct entailed a breach of duty
primarily owed to the general public; 88
e) where the injuries were caused while the parent was engaged in a
vocational, business, or employment activity not privy to his parental
responsibilities; 9
f) where the parent is covered by liability insurance;90
g) where a parent lacked custody and control of his unemancipated
child at the time the tortious act occurred; 9'
h) where the parent has abdicated his parental responsibilities;92 or
i) in an action for contribution from the parent whose negligence
contributed to the child's injuries. 93
However, these limitations on immunity are being extended as more
and more jurisdictions decide to abrogate parent-child immunity.
B. Abrogation of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine
The first attempt at balancing the child's right to institute an action for
negligently-inflicted injuries and the parent's responsibilities in rearing
and disciplining his child was made in Goller v. White. 94 The court in
Goller abrogated the parent-child immunity doctrine except in circum-
stances where the negligent conduct involved either "an exercise of
parental authority... or an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
" Courts have held that the parental immunity doctrine does not apply where the
parent has died. E.g., Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Myers,
2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972). Contra McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of
McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971); Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882
(1968). However, the rule serves as a bar in actions where the child, or both the child and
parent, dies and a claim is instituted by the child's representative. E.g., Orefice v. Albert,
237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970) (conformed to 239 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)).
8 E.g., Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Il. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E 2d 1127 (1978).
9 E.g., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.
2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) (en banc).
90 E.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975). Under those
conditions, the action is not between the child and the parent but between the child and the
parent's insurance company. Some courts, however, refuse to recognize liability insurance
coverage as a basis for maintaining a claim by an unemancipated child against the parent,
or the parent's estate, for injuries proximately caused by the parent's negligent conduct.
E.g., Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937).
"' Apparently, under these circumstances, the action would not seriously disrupt the
family relationship. E.g., Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
92 E.g., Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965).
13 E.g., Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972).
94 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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services, and other care." 95 After Goller, the trend of most American
courts has been to abolish the immunity, either totally or partially, while
others have retained the rule.9
6
In those states recognizing abrogation of parental tort immunity, the
bar against immunity is not always absolute. Some courts have held that
parental liability does not exist in cases where the parent's negligent act
involved the negligent supervision of an unemancipated child97 or the
negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality to an unemancip-
ated child.98 Other jurisdictions that have completely abolished parental
tort immunity have declared that the inadequacy of the parent's insur-
ance coverage will not affect the ability of the injured child to maintain
a cause of action against its parent for injuries sustained by the parent's
negligent conduct. 99 In a few cases, however, parental liability has not
been extended to situations in which the negligent conduct of the parent
involved either an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the
child or an exercise of parental discretion with respect to provisions for
the care of the child. 10o
The applicability of these exceptions is uncertain; each jurisdiction
must be examined in order to determine the scope of the abrogation, if
any, of parental immunity. The right of action against a parent for
injuries caused by his negligent conduct is particularly critical when
faced with a prenatal injury claim, alleging tortious conduct by the
surrogate mother.
IV. CHILD VERSUS MOTHER
Surrogate motherhood relationships are generating a multitude of
perplexing problems for the contracting parents, the surrogate mother,
and the judiciary. One major issue bound to arise from this unique
Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
s For a more comprehensive discussion of parent-child immunity, see generally W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, § 122, at 907; Ingram & Barder, The Decline of the
Doctrine of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 68 ILL. B.J. 596 (1980); Comment, Child v. Parent:
Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1967); Comment, Tort Actions Between
Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152 (1961). For
a survey of parent-child immunity in the United States, see Hollister, supra note 83, at 528
app. A recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court has abolished the doctrine of parent-child
immunity in Ohio. Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
17 E.g., Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974);
Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972).
" E.g., Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332,385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978),
modified, Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774
(1983); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
" E.g., D'Ambrosio v. D'Ambrosio, 60 Misc. 2d 886, 304 N.Y.S,2d 154 (1969).
oe Eg., Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (1978);
Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1984).
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relation is the liability of the surrogate mother for tortious conduct which
results in injury to her child. As aptly stated in Smith v. Brennan:lol
[J]ustice requires that the principle be recognized that a child has
a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body. If the
wrongful conduct of another interferes with that right, and it can
be established by competent proof that there is a causal connec-
tion between the wrongful interference and the harm suffered by
the child when born, damages for such harm should be recover-
able by the child.102
This right, coupled with the recognition of both recovery for prenatal
injuries and the inapplicability of parent-child immunity, should afford
an avenue by which a child carried by a surrogate mother can seek
redress for negligently-inflicted injuries.
A. The Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Parent-Child Immunity
The doctrine of parent-child immunity should not represent a hin-
drance to a child's right of action against the surrogate mother for
negligently-inflicted prenatal injuries. This immunity rule actually lends
support for recognizing a suit sounding in tort.
The nature of the surrogate mother relationship is vastly different from
that of the conventional method of propogating the human species. The
major rationale underlying the reluctance to impose liability on a natural
mother for poor prenatal care seems inapplicable to this unique arrange-
ment called surrogate motherhood. In a surrogate mother situation, the
childless couple seeks a suitable woman to serve as the "carrier," either
through an independent quest or an established, reputable surrogate
mother clinic.' 0 3 After genetic screening and physical and psychological
examinations of the contracting parents and the potential surrogate
mother,10 4 the parties enter into a contract whereby the surrogate mother
101 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
102 Id. at 364, 157 A.2d at 503. Accord Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633,
635, 165 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1960) (overruling Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884)).
See generally Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PRoaBs. 47,
77-81 (1978) (discussion of child's right to be born sound).
1o3 L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 203-07.
104 The contracting parents are screened for genetic disorders in cases where the husband
and wife transfer their fertilized egg to the surrogate mother or where the husband donates
his sperm to inseminate the surrogate mother artificially. The surrogate mother is screened
for genetic disorders in cases where she is artificially inseminated by the contracting
husband's sperm or that of a donor. In the first situation described, the contracting parents
are the "natural" (i.e., genetic) parents, while the surrogate is merely the gestational
mother; in the latter situation, the contracting father (or donor) and the surrogate mother
are the true genetic parents. Id. at 203-07.
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will carry the infant for the contracting parents.10 5 The surrogate mother
assumes her part of the contract with complete knowledge of the
consequences of her acts.10 6 Among the innumerable provisions incorpo-
rated into the typical surrogate mother contract are those expressly
requiring the surrogate mother to adhere to an approved program of
prenatal care, in addition to express prohibitions against detrimental or
risky activities. l0 7
The mere fact that the surrogate mother enters into a contractual
agreement to carry the infant for the contracting parents imposes upon
the surrogate a higher standard of care than that imposed on a mother in
the traditional childbearing role. The vast majority of courts undoubtedly
would be reluctant to find the latter liable for injuries sustained as a
result of negligent prenatal care. The basis for that position is under-
standable and can be distinguished from the scenario by which a
gestational surrogate is employed.
The policy justifications for parent-child immunity shed light on the
differences between an action against the "natural" mother and an action
against the surrogate mother. In those states retaining at least partial
105 Id. at 216.
106 The surrogate mother agrees to carry and nurture the unborn child and then
relinquish the baby to the genetic parents after its birth in consideration for a stipulated
sum of money for her services, and for the payment of all necessary expenses and medical
costs incurred during the gestation period, the time of birth, and recovery. This feature of
the surrogate mother contract is one of the major concerns of surrogate motherhood
arrangements. The exchange of money in return for carrying the baby to full term has been
challenged as a violation of the adoption laws since payment is expressly prohibited in
adoption procedures. E.g., Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 373, 378-87 (1981); Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 So. ILL.
UNIV. L.J. 147, 156-61; Comment, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A
Nursery Full of Unresolued Questions, 17 WILLIAMETrE L.J. 913, 944-47 (1981). The exchange
of money has been interpreted to constitute a form of baby selling, thereby invalidating the
contracts. See generally Black, supra; Keane, supra; Comment, supra for a discussion of the
problems of surrogate motherhood relative to black markets for babies. However, a
surrogate mother cannot be expected to undertake this responsibility for purely altruistic
purposes; the payment of money is appropriate to compensate her for her time, labor, and
services. Sappideen, The Surrogate Mother A Growing Problem, 6 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 79,
93-96 (1983). Moreover, adoption laws were created to eliminate the baby black market once
prevalent in society and thus serve no useful purpose with respect to surrogate motherhood
arrangements. Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
107, 117 (1982). The complexities of this problem, however, are beyond the scope of this
Note. For enlightening discussions on the problems arising from surrogate mother con-
tracts, see generally the law review articles cited in L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 303-04 app.
D.
107 The types of provisions contained in most surrogate mother contracts are best
illustrated in L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 233-36. A multitude of problems arise regarding
the validity of enforceability of these contracts. It is uncertain whether recovery can be
granted under contract law. An analysis of the feasibility of contract actions brought by the
injured child is beyond the scope of this Note. See the law review articles cited id. at 303-04
for a discussion of the validity or enforceability of surrogate mother contracts.
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immunity, the courts have based their rationale on the preservation of
the familial relationship and have advanced numerous justifications for
this rule. It has been contended that an assertion of a claim against the
parent would disrupt the unity of the family.108 An action against the
parent also was said to threaten or deplete the family's assets which
would otherwise be allocated to the other minor family members'0 9 and
usurp the parents' ability to discipline their children effectively. 110
On the other hand, a surrogate mother's relationship to the child is not
based on a continuing familial relationship and cannot pose a threat to
the discipline of that child for the family harmony. Moreover, since the
surrogate mother is not a family member, she cannot pose a threat to the
depletion of family assets, nor can she be held responsible for ensuing
hostilities from the maintenance of such a suit. These traditional policy
justifications have no bearing on the surrogate mother and are thus
inapplicable.
Even if, by any stretch of the imagination, immunity is to be deemed
appropriate, exceptions to this rule have been carved out, illustrating the
very point of this argument: a surrogate mother stands in the position as
a third party to the child."'I The parent is absolved from immunity where
the injuries were caused while the parent was engaged in a vocational,
business, or employment activity not associated with his parental respon-
sibilities.11 2 This exception acknowledges that occasions exist when the
parent and child do not stand in relation to each other as family members.
It further acknowledges that when the child is injured while the parent
was acting in a non-familial fashion, the parent assumes the position of
a third party and can be held liable for harm proximately caused by his
negligent conduct. Similarly, the surrogate mother, by nature of her
arrangement with the contracting parents, is engaged for the sole
purpose of carrying the infant to term. Her conduct cannot be viewed as
anything other than a business or employment activity; thus, her
relationship to the child is unequivocally that of a third party.
Furthermore, when a parent tortiously or intentionally injures the
child, the family relationship is deemed to have been temporarily
abandoned, thus precluding parental immunity. 13 In light of this excep-
tion, the surrogate mother's role under the contract merits stronger
weight for permitting a child redress for the harm caused by the
surrogate mother's conduct. Since the surrogate mother has been in-
108 E.g., Eschen v. Roney, 127 Ga. App. 719, 194 S.E.2d 589 (1972).
109 Id.
110 E.g., Begley v. Kohl and Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, 254 A.2d 907
(1969).
, 1 Even the exceptions are based on the parents' detachment from the familial relation-
ship. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
112 E.g., Felderhoff v, Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971).
13 E.g., Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982).
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
formed of the nature of the contract and has consented to its terms,
subsequent acts which are prohibited under the contract, express and
implied, amount to nothing less than willful or intentional misconduct.
Therefore, the surrogate mother would also be excepted from immunity
under this analysis.
In those states abolishing the immunity rule, either totally or partially,
circumstances may arise which reinstate parental tort immunity. 114 The
principle inquiry in these circumstances is whether the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and
other care.115 The discretion afforded parents seems to recognize that
they sometimes can be careless or forgetful. Moreover, what may be
considered negligent in one situation may be appropriate in another.
Consequently, negligence is determined by taking all factors into consid-
eration and assessing whether or not the discretion exercised by the
parent went beyond a reasonable level.
The surrogate mother's conduct does not fall within the realm of this
"exception" to the abrogation of the parent-child immunity rule. The
surrogate mother neither exercises parental duties nor assumes any
parental responsibilities for the child after its birth. The surrogate's sole
purpose is to carry the infant to term, employing the best possible
prenatal care. No justifiable application of this "reasonable discretion"
principle exists vis-A-vis surrogate motherhood.
Even if it could be argued that the surrogate mother is the parent,
without assuming the attendant responsibilities, liability under the
"reasonable discretion" standard would fail instantaneously. The surro-
gate mother's conduct with respect to tobacco smoking, drug ingestion,
alcohol consumption, and improper diet could not be adjudged as an
exercise of reasonable parental discretion. The following case exemplifies
this contention.
In Grodin v. Grodin,116 the son and father instituted an action against
the mother and doctor for damages to the son's teeth, allegedly resulting
from the use of medication during pregnancy. In Grodin, the physician
assured the mother that it was impossible for her to become pregnant. As
a result of these assurances, she continued to take her medication,
Tetracycline. After she consulted with a different physician who informed
her that she was seven or eight months pregnant, she ceased taking the
medication. The son developed teeth that were brown and discolored due
to the ingestion of the drug. 117 The court noted that a child may maintain
a cause of action against a parent for injury suffered as a result of the
114 See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
115 See infra text accompanying notes 116-24.
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ordinary negligence of the parent.1 1 8 The court further acknowledged
exceptions to this law, relying primarily on the discretion afforded to
parents in providing for their children.' 9 It held that when the alleged
negligent conduct of the parent involves an exercise of reasonable
parental discretion regarding the provision of necessities, such as food,
clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care, parent-
child immunity will preclude an action by the child. 120
In analyzing the applicability of this exception to the facts of the case,
the appellate court reiterated the trial court's assessment of this excep-
tion:
The policy underlying the exceptions is "that within the frame-
work of parental authority and discretion, parents must be
accorded immunity from litigation which in fact would disrupt
family harmony and unity. The immunity is limited to transac-
tions which are essentially parental . .." Thus, this Court finds
[this] exception asks essentially whether the defendant's behav-
ior involves the exercise of parental discretion in an area in which
such discretion is ordinarily or reasonably employed. 12'
The key words in this analysis are "reasonably employed;" the real
issue was whether the mother's discretion in taking the drug was
reasonable.
The court also relied on Womack v. Buchhorn122 by asserting that
Womack does not limit those who may be liable for negligently-inflicted
prenatal injury. It simply referred to the wrongful conduct of "an-
other."'123 The court in Grodin thus stated that "the litigating child's
mother would bear the same liability for injurious, negligent conduct as
would a third person."124
The decision to continue taking medication during pregnancy was
deemed to be an exercise of the mother's discretion.125 The court advanced
the following analytical framework for assessing the reasonableness of
the allegedly negligent conduct: "The reasonableness of the risk of harm
whether analyzed in terms of duty, proximate cause or a specific standard
118 Id. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870. The court relied on Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199
N.W.2d 169 (1972), which overruled the doctrine of intrafamilial tort immunity.
"9 Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870. The other exception noted by the
court arises when the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental
authority over the child. Id.
120 Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 871.
121 Id. at 399, 301 N.W.2d at 870 (citations omitted).
122 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
123 Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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of care turns on how the utility of the defendant's conduct is viewed in
relation to the magnitude of the risk thereby created." 126
The rationale in Grodin is especially pertinent to a surrogate mother-
child tort action. Employing this rationale, the magnitude of the risk
created by the surrogate's decision to engage in harmful conduct is great.
Whether the reasonableness of this risk is analyzed in terms of duty,
causation, or some specific standard of care, the surrogate mother's
knowledge of the impending pregnancy and the extensive guidelines and
provisions to which she has agreed warrant a finding of unreasonableness
if she deviates from abstention. Her freedom to exercise discretion in
matters of prenatal care is restricted the moment she is impregnated. The
determination of reasonableness under these circumstances precludes the
invocation of parental immunity for the alleged negligent conduct.
The previously-described analysis of the surrogate mother's relation-
ship to the unborn child illustrates the surrogate's potential liability for
negligently-inflicted prenatal injuries.
B. The Gestational Environment and the Health of the Fetus
The behavior of the surrogate mother during pregnancy is of monu-
mental concern to the contracting parents 127 and focuses on the best
interests of the unborn child. Inherent in the surrogate motherhood
arrangement is the responsibility of the surrogate mother to abstain from
tobacco smoking, alcohol consumption and drug ingestion, and to adhere
to a program of good nutrition. Following a program of appropriate
prenatal care is part and parcel of the agreement-a duty owed primarily
to the unborn child.128 As a result of the myriad of advances in medical
126 Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 871. The appellate court disagreed only with the trial court's
procedural application of the law. It stated that the reasonableness of the parental
discretion afforded by this exception is an issue for the jury and, in this case, the motion for
summary judgment should have been denied. The case was therefore reversed and
remanded to ascertain the reasonableness of the mother's conduct in continuing to ingest
the medicine. If found to be unreasonable, the defendant-mother would not be protected by
parental immunity. Id.
127 The parents, however, are not alone in their desire to protect the infant. The states
have taken an interest in protecting a child through the parens patriae doctrine, which gives
the state power to protect those of its members who are unable to protect themselves and are
in need of its protection. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (state, as
parens patriae, may restrict parents' control; "rights of parenthood are [not] beyond
limitation"). The states have also taken an express interest in protecting prenatal life. E.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("state may properly assert important interests
in ... protecting potential life"); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga.
86, 89, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1981) (per curiam) (intrusion into couple's life outweighed by
duty of state to protect living unborn human).
12' Although the surrogate mother's freedom of action would be restricted, "denying [this]
cause of action would abridge [the] child's right to be born with a sound mind and body and
would deny society's parens patriae interest." Note, supra note 101, at 79. In ascertaining
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science and the state of knowledge regarding fetal growth and develop-
ment, the effects of the maternal environment on the fetus are more
discernible than ever before.1 29
1. Nutrition
Nutrition is perhaps the most important factor in the proper develop-
ment of the fetus.1 30 An inadequate maternal diet is often the leading
cause of a large number of malformations in newborns. 13' This is evinced
by reduced brain weight and smaller head circumference of the infant. 132
Malnutrition also impairs fetal brain development. 133 In fact, severe
malnutrition during the first six months can cause permanent mental
deficiency in the infant. 134 In addition, prematurity is frequently the
result of poor nutrition in mothers.135
Studies of the effects of various nutritional deficiencies on developing
fetuses have shown startling results. A lack of iodine, which is essential
whether intervention is appropriate, the courts would have to consider the nature of the
"parental" conduct entailed and the extent of the infringement upon the surrogate mother's
right of autonomy. Id. at 77-80; Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in
Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1981). The latter commentator believes that the more
effective means of preventing prenatal injury, rather than allowing suits in order to deter
deleterious conduct, would be state intervention in prenatal health care by imposing
requirements or restrictions on expectant mothers. Id. at 1051-52, 1064-65. The rationale
advanced, which supports the contention that permitting suits would not deter conduct
which could cause prenatal injury, imports the contention that the expectant mother would
not anticipate a law suit. In addition, it has been claimed that a suit would create tension
in the parent-child relationship and would not shift the economic risk because the parents
would invariably support the child. Id. at 1051-52 n.5. In a surrogate motherhood
arrangement, however, the recognition of such suits would not be as oppressive as with the
conventional mode of parenthood since the surrogate would not be classified as the mother
or participant in raising and educating the child. Being duly informed and having given
written consent to the terms of the contract, the imposition of liability would promote good
health care or deter engaging in surrogate motherhood arrangements until the contract's
legality is ascertained.
129 Several authors have suggested that a mother who gives birth to a child in the
conventional manner should be liable for injuries inflicted owing to harmful prenatal
conduct. Shaw, The Potential Plaintiff: Preconception and Prenatal Torts, in GENETICS AND
THE LAW II 228 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1980); Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal
Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 47, 84-88 (1978); Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries:
The Right of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 582 (1976).
130 A. MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 57 (1962); B. LUKE, MATERNAL NUTRmON 125 (1979).
131 A. MONTAGU, supra note 130, at 80.
1.2 B. LUKE, supra note 130, at 126. Although there is a close correlation between head
circumference and brain size, there is no concrete evidence to indicate that brain size in
humans is related to intelligence. Id. at 127.
133 Douglass, Prenatal risks: an obstetrician's point of view, in RiSKS IN THE PRACTICE OF
MODERN OBSTErICS 1, 12 (S. Aldjem ed. 1972).
134 Brown & Freehafer, Prenatal risks: a pediatrician's point of view, in RISKS IN THE
PRACTICE OF MODERN OBSTETRICS 28, 45 (S. Aladjem ed. 1972).
13' A. MONTACU, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH 38 (1964).
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for the production of thyroid hormones, may cause a child to be born with
goiter or signs of cretinism. 13 6 A vitamin D deficiency in the mother,
arising from insufficient dietary intake, malabsorption, or lack of sun-
light, will cause rickets in the newborn, a disease characterized by
softening of the bones.137 Studies performed with animals demonstrate
that vitamin A is essential for the actual formation of the organs of the
fetus during early pregnancy. When mothers are deprived of this vita-
min, the infants are frequently born with underdeveloped major organs
and various other defects. 138 Those deprived of Vitamin B12 during
pregnancy give birth to young suffering from hydrocephaly.1 39 Ribofla-
vin, one of the members of the B2 complex, is essential to the development
of the jaws, teeth and palate. A deficiency of riboflavin can cause
malocclusion of the jaws and teeth and even perhaps cleft palate. 140 An
insufficient intake of calcium, which is necessary for the proper develop-
ment of the teeth and proper growth of bone, could result in rickets.14 '
The expectant mother, however, should be reluctant to commence a
program of dietary supplements, unless given her physician's approval
and recommendation of a specific supplement because a multivitamin
supplement may also prove to be harmful to the unborn child. 142
2. Alcohol Consumption
Alcohol consumption during pregnancy can be extremely dangerous to
the fetus. Children born of heavy drinkers have demonstrated physical
abnormalities, retarded growth and developmental delay on follow-up
136 R. STEVENSON, THE FETUS AND NEWLY BORN INFANT: INFLUENCES OF THE PRENATAL
ENVIRONMENT 301 (1973). The features of cretinism are retarded bone growth, ossification,
and, in the case of untreated cretinism, mental retardation. Id.
137 Id. at 304.
13s A. MONTAGU, supra note 135, at 43.
139 Id. Hydrocephalus is an abnormal accumulation of cerebrospinal fluid in and around
the brain, evidenced by an enlarged skull and weak or retarded mentality. 2 J. SCHMIDT,
ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE H-102 (1984).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. One case was reported evincing an unusual and severe combination of birth
defects in a child born to a woman who was taking the multivitamin Pregnavite Forte F
(Bencard) in the periconceptional period. The case was reported to the Committee on Safety
of Medicines, which had received reports of 61 adverse reactions to this and fourteen related
iron and iron-vitamin compound preparations between January 1964 and February 1983.
Eight of the reports related congenital malformations. The manufacturers confirmed that
no formal systematic study had been conducted to test the safety of Bencard in the first
trimester and that they were never aware of any untoward reaction from it. David, Unusual
Limb-Reduction Defect in Infant Born to Mother Taking Periconceptional Multivitamin
Supplement (No. 8375) LANCET 507 (Mar. 3, 1984) (letter to the editor).
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examinations at a mean age of one year. 143 The children born of alcoholic
mothers generally exhibit a condition termed "Fetal Alcohol Syndrome"
(FAS). The abnormalities most consistently observed with FAS are
prenatal and postnatal growth retardation, microencephaly (an abnormal
smallness of the head), an unusual facial pattern, minor joint and limb
abnormalities, and cardiac malformations. In some instances, severe
brain malformation is observed. 4 4 Alcohol consumption has also been
found to cause reduced birth weights in infants whose mothers' average
intake of absolute alcohol measured thirty milliliters (one ounce) per
day.1 45 Also associated with maternal drinking of as little as thirty
milliliters per week, is an increased risk of spontaneous abortion. 146
Alcohol is ingested in other forms as well. The effects of cough syrups,
mouthwashes, and alcohol-based "tonics" can display typical FAS char-
acteristics. 147
3. Tobacco Smoking
Millions of normal healthy children are born to women who are heavy
smokers; that does not, however, obviate the danger.' 48 Tobacco smoke
includes gas which robs the blood of oxygen; 149 the nicotine which is
absorbed from the smoke is known to act on nerve cells and the
respiratory centers.16 0 The major effect of cigarette smoking on the
developing fetus is growth retardation.151 The most common effect of
maternal smoking, however, is prematurity of birth. 152 As a consequence,
143 Golden, Sokol, Kuhnert, & Bottoms, Maternal Alcohol Use and Infant Development, 70
PEDIATRICS 931, 933 (1982).
144 Chernick, Childiaeva, & loffe, Effects of maternal alcohol intake and smoking in
neonatal electroencephalogram and anthropometric measurements, 146 AM. J. OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. 41, 45 (1983). Studies of moderate or minimal drinking effects have not yet
established a safe level. Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Fetal Effects of
Maternal Alcohol Use, 249 J.A.M.A. 2517, 2520 (1983) [hereinafter cited as "Council
Report"].
,45 Council Report, supra note 144, at 2517.
146 Id.
147 Chasnoff, Diggs, & Schnoll, Fetal Alcohol Effects and Maternal Cough Syrup Abuse,
135 Am. J. Dis. CHILD. 968 (1981).
"48 A. MONTAGII, supra note 135, at 102.
149 Id,
150 Id. at 101.
i5" R. STEVENSON, supra note 136, at 96.
152 Longo, Some Health Consequences of Materhal Smoking: Issues Without Answers, in
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND MECHANISM OF TERATOGENESIS 13, 16 (W. Nyhan & K. Jones eds. 1982)
(reprinted from 18(3A) BIRTH DEFECTS 13, 16 (1981) (Part A of Annual Review of Birth
Defects, 1981 March of Dimes Defects Foundation)). Studies have indicated that the risk of
premature delivery is 36-47% greater and that approximately 13% of all preterm births can
be attributed to smoking. A. MONTAGU, supra note 135, at 101.
It has been suggested that there may be an interaction of maternal nutrition and
smoking. The theory is that the reduced fetal weight associated with the smoking mother
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premature children are often less able to handle the stresses of life
resulting from other causes. These children can experience some illness,
weakness of various organs that may cause trouble later in life, lower
intellectual capacity and, in some extreme cases, death. 153 Spontaneous
abortion has also been found to occur more frequently in smoking
mothers. 54 The rate of fetal death occurring after twenty weeks of
gestation also increases significantly with the level of maternal smok-
ing. 155 Recent studies also show a positive correlation between maternal
smoking and possible congenital malformations. 15 In addition, maternal
use of marijuana during pregnancy has been associated with smaller
infant size at birth and features considered compatible with fetal alcohol
syndrome.1 5 7
4. Drug Ingestion
All ingested drugs are capable of passing through the placenta from the
mother to the child. The effects of drugs on the developing fetus depend
upon the specific drug ingested, the quantity taken, and the period of
pregnancy in which the drug was consumed. 158 Studies of the effects of
narcotics addiction during pregnancy demonstrate a high prematurity
rate, reduced birth rate, and symptoms of drug withdrawal.15 9 Drug
results from reduced food intake and therefore reduced availability of nutrients. Longo,
supra, at 152. Yet, it appears that smoking women have higher food intakes than
non-smoking women during pregnancy. Picone, Allen, Schramm, & Olsen, Pregnancy
outcome in North American Women. I. Effects of diet, cigarette smoking, and psychological
stress on maternal weight gain, 36 Am. J. CtUN. NUTR. 1205, 1211 (1982). Perhaps it can be
best explained by noting that the nicotine in smoke has a number of effects which may
increase heat loss from the body and impair the efficiency of the utilization of dietary
energy. Id. It also has been shown to increase metabolic rates in humans and may have a
substantial effect on caloric requirements. Id.
153 A. MONTAGU, supra note 135, at 103.
154 Id. The risk of spontaneous abortion is 30-70% higher in smoking mothers and
increases with the number of cigarettes smoked. Longo, supra note 152, at 16. A 1949 study
of the effects of smoking in 112 German women who were smokers, compared with 1,381
non-smoking mothers, revealed an abortion rate of 22.5% in smoking mothers as compared
to 7.4% in non-smoking mothers. Prematurity, stillbirths, vomiting, difficult labors, and
edema were also more frequent in the smoking mothers. A. MONTAGU, supra note 135 at
110.
i"' Longo, supra note 152, at 16.
l56 Id. at 18.
117 Hingson, Alpert, Day, Dooling, Kayne, Morelock, Oppenheimer, & Zuckerman,
Effects of Maternal Drinking and Marijuana Use on Fetal Growth and Development, 70
Pediatrics 539, 544 (1982).
158 A. MONTAGU, supra note 130, at 323.
159 Id. at 325. The symptoms include excitement, marked irritability, excessive crying,
sleeplessness, tremors and convulsions, respiratory difficulties, feeding difficulties, vomit-
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addiction during pregnancy is almost certain to result in the birth of a
child who shows signs of drug addiction. If the child survives, it will
probably exhibit a birth weight smaller than a normal child and therefore
will be more vulnerable to other stresses. 60 Stillbirths and spontaneous
abortions are also common effects of drug addiction. 1 1
Antibiotics may produce malformations involving the eyes, nervous
system, viscera, cardiovascular system, or skeleton. 62 For example,
Tetracycline causes brown staining of the teeth and may effect the bony
structure, even causing premature cessation of the growth of the long
bones. 163 Streptomycin, another antibiotic, may affect the auditory
nerve.164
Analgesics may also produce teratogenic effects. 165 Mild analgesics
include substances like aspirin. The effects of aspirin, however, remain
inconclusive. One study indicated a slight increase in the number of
congential anomalies when the mothers took aspirin in the first sixteen
weeks of pregnancy. 66 Large doses of aspirin taken constantly seem to
reduce birth weight significantly.167 Darvon, another mild analgesic,
may produce drug dependency in the newborn.168
These effects illustrate the risks involved when an expectant woman
deviates from proper prenatal care. 69 In recognizing a cause of action
ing, diarrhea, yawning, sneezing, and fever, the severity of which bears a direct relation to
the dose taken. Id.
ISO A. MONTAGU, supra note 135, at 83.
161 A. MONTAGU, supra note 130, at 326.
162 Id. at 340.
1e3 Douglass, supra note 133, at 7.
164 Id.
... Teratogenesis is defined as "embryonic maldevelopment leading to teratism [a
congenital anomaly or monstrosity] or serious congenital defects." BLAKISTON'S GOULD MED.
DICTIONARY 1357 (4th ed. 1979).
i66 Yaffe & Catz, Drugs and the intrauterine patient, in RisKs IN THE PRACTICE OF MODERN
OBSTETaICS 82, 90 (S. Aladjem ed. 1972).
117 Niederhoff & Zahradnik, Analgesics During Pregnancy, 75 AM. J. MED. 117, 118
(1983). Aspirin given to mice and rats on the sixth to last day of pregnancy produced high
death rates in fetuses or cleft lips. A. MONTAGU, supra note 135, at 82.
Irs Yaffe & Catz, supra note 166, at 92.
"' The presence of high states of anxiety and stress has been shown to be the causal
element of a variety of abnormalities in pregnancy. Studies have demonstrated that a
negative maternal attitude can give rise to a significant increase in perinatal death and
congenital anomalies. Laukaran & Van den Berg, The relationship of maternal attitude to
pregnancy outcomes and obstetric complications, 136 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 374 (1980).
Premature birth and fetal growth retardation are frequently considered to be complications
of maternal anxiety or life stress. Newton, Binu, Maskrey, & Phillips, Psychological Stress
in Pregnancy and its Relation to the Onset of Premature Labour, 2 BR. MED. J. 411, 413
(1979); Pollard, Effects of stress administered during pregnancy on reproductive capacity and
subsequent development of the offspring of rats: prolonged effects on the litters of a second
pregnancy, 100 J. ENDOCRINOL. 301, 304 (1984)
It is interesting to note that since New York State legalized abortion, a decrease in the
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predicated on negligent prenatal care, the primary concern should be the
fact that the child has suffered an injury and will continue life with the
injury or deformity-an injury or deformity which could have been
avoided had the surrogate mother complied with the terms of the contract
and fulfilled her duty towards the child by exercising reasonable care. It
is well settled that third parties cannot injure a fetus without incurring
tort liability; 70 allowing a surrogate mother to escape liability would be
highly unjust. The only requisite for recovery should be the fulfillment of
the basic elements of tort liability.
Even in light of the nebulous validity or enforceability of the con-
tract, 71 imposing tort liability on a surrogate mother predicated on
negligent prenatal care should have two beneficial effects: the deterrence
of surrogate motherhood arrangements until its associated problems are
resolved and the promotion of good prenatal health care by the surrogate
mothers who enter into these contracts, thus serving both the contractual
interests of the parties involved and, more importantly, the best interests
of the child.
C. The Essence of Tort Liability
"The law of negligence is primarily common law, whose great virtue is
its adaptability to the conditions and needs of changing times."'172 The
incidents of malformations, like cleft palate, has been observed. Pollard, supra at 305. For
an interesting discussion of studies focusing on the effects of psychosocial stress and anxiety
during pregnancy, see Gorsuch & Key, Abnormalities of Pregnancy as a Function ofAnxiety
and Life Stress, 36 PSYCH-OSOM. MED. 352 (1974); Newton & Hunt, Psychosocial stress in
pregnancy and its relation to low birth rats, 288 BR. MED. J. 1191 (1984).
A surrogate mother could experience greater stresses resulting from the role she assumes
in nurturing another woman's child. For example, the surrogate may worry excessively
about the consequences of the arrangement if the child is born deformed and the contracting
couple refuses to take the child. Or, perhaps, since the surrogate mother is merely "renting"
her womb, she may not sense a duty towards the fetus and therefore will not pursue a proper
course of prenatal care as stipulated in the agreement. A claim predicated on negligent
exposure to stress would be difficult to support. While statistics detailing the effects of stress
and anxiety are available, the task of proving causation in a specific case would probably be
futile. Even if the state of stress could be causally linked to the damage, it is doubtful that
negligence could be demonstrated. Science has not progressed sufficiently to enable
individuals to control their emotions to this extent or to establish that one state of mind is
more culpable than another in an attempt to determine negligent "feelings." However, it is
suggested that surrogate mother clinics make available to the surrogate mothers on-going
counseling to help alleviate undue stress or tension and to cope with this new experience.
Parker, Surrogate Motherhood: The Interaction of Litigation, Legislation and Psychiatry, 5
INT'L J.L. & PSCYIIIATRY 341, 353 (1982).
i70 See supra note 69.
ivi For a list of selected legal publications discussing the status of surrogate mother
contracts, see L. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 303-04 app. D.
112 Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (1977) (recognition
that a child has a cause of action for prenatal injuries sustained any time after conception).
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inherent flexibility of tort law affords a remedy where it is recognized
that a plaintiffs interests have been violated by the negligent conduct of
another. 173 When a surrogate mother has pursued a course of prenatal
care proven to be deleterious to the health and well-being of the fetus and
injury results, justice demands a remedy. As eloquently stated in Woods
v. Lancet:
Precedent is merely a guide; its absence never a bar .... The
absence of precedent should give no immunity to one who by his
wrongful act has invaded the right of an individual. No right is
more inherent, more sacrosanct, than that of an individual in his
possession and enjoyment of his life, his limbs, and his body. The
law is not static and inert, but is sufficiently elastic to meet
changing conditions. It is presumed to keep pace with present-day
concepts. To deny the infant relief.., is not only a harsh result,
but its effect is to do reverence to an outmoded, timeworn fiction
not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and
unjustified.174
In addressing the issue of recovery predicated on tortious conduct, it is
mandatory to examine the applicability of the traditional formula neces-
sary to state a cause of action for which relief may be sought: duty,
breach, causation, and damages.175
1. Duty
Duty is largely grounded in the natural responsibilities of social
living and human relations, such as have the recognition of
reasonable men; fulfillment is had by a correlative standard of
conduct. 176
173 "For wherever the common law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a
remedy by action; and, therefore, wherever a new injury is done, a new method of remedy
must be pursued." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123.
"Simply because the question is new does not mean that it is invalid.... So it is life itself
which determines what particular interest will outweigh another. The judicial process by
nature is a scheme of evaluating the varying forces which make society." Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 360, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1256 (1977) (Dooley, J., concurring).
174 278 App. Div. 913, 914, 105 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (dissent), rev'd, 303 N.Y. 349, 102
N.E.2d 691 (1951).
175 See generally W. PRossER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, § 30, at 164-65 (elements of
claim).
176 Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441,447, 383 A.2d 1220, 1223
(1978).
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Duty is not a static concept; 177 it is not predicated solely on foresee-
ability,17 8 albeit often used synonymously or in conjunction with proxi-
mate cause. 179 Duty may be simplisticly summarized as that obligation
imposed upon each of us to exercise due care toward others to whom
unreasonable threats of harm might reasonably be expected to result.180
American courts have held that the extension of the duty concept to
prenatal injury claims is warranted, particularly in light of substantial
medical advances. 8 1
Courts have also extended the imposition of duty in prenatal injury
actions to the father of the unborn infant. In People v. Yates,152 the court
held that the father willfully and unlawfully omitted to furnish necessary
food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance for his child. sa The court
stated that the father had assumed a duty to the unborn child, five
months in gestation, by reason of the paternity in the pregnancy. 8 4 The
only difference the court found in the care owed to an unborn child is that
provision of these necessities must be made indirectly through the
mother, who acts as an intermediary in oxygenating and nourishing the
fetus. 185
The surrogate mother stands on the same footing as the father in Yates.
If a duty rightfully can be imposed on a father for failing to furnish
necessities to the pregnant mother for the benefit of the fetus, it is
incomprehensible how a surrogate mother, whose sole responsibility is to
exercise the most stringent care while carrying the child to term, could
escape liability for similar willful and unlawful conduct. The surrogate
assumes a grave duty to act reasonably the moment she is impregnated.
The identity of the negligent actor is irrelevant; the crux of the problem
is whether a duty to the unborn child existed, and, if answered in the
affirmative, whether the resultant injury was proximately caused by a
breach of that duty.
177 Eg., Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 355, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
17 id. at 354, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
'7 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, note 15, § 53, at 358. A discussion of the duty
problems can be found in Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, (pts. 1 & 2) 28
COLUM. L. REv. 1014 (1928), 29 COLUM L. REv. 255 (1929); Morison, A Re-examination of the
Duty of Care, 11 MOD. L. REV. 9 (1948); Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 191 (1954).
"' See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (issue of
foreseeability discussed in terms of duty).
181 See supra notes 64-68.
182 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931) (per curiam). Accord People v. Sianes, 134
Cal. App. 355, 25 P.2d 487 (1933).
183 Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. at 786, 298 P. at 963.
l Id. at 787, 298 P. at 963. See, e.g., Shack v. Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988
(1976) ("[A] conditional prospective liability to a fetus is created when an unborn child's
mother is not sufficiently informed of the risks, hazards and alternatives of the delivery
procedure administered, and such liability attaches upon the birth of the child.
185 Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. at 788, 298 P. at 963.
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Negligence is behavior which should be recognized as involving unrea-
sonable danger to another. 8 6 This risk of danger is based upon the
knowledge of existing facts and some reasonable belief that harm may
follow.18 7 The woman's affirmative act of seeking the opportunity to serve
as a surrogate establishes that she is willing to assume a special role in
carrying the infant. The woman desiring to become a surrogate mother
knows, or should know, that she will have to comply with certain
requirements. These requirements are not only contractual terms to
adhere to a suitable course of prenatal care but are, in themselves,
standards to be incorporated into the degree of due care to which the
surrogate mother must conform. In this situation, the risk is that
maternal tobacco smoking, alcohol consumption, drug ingestion, or
malnutrition could cause physical or mental abnormalities. If this danger
is not apparent to anyone else, it is apparent, or should be apparent, to
the surrogate or to one in the position of the surrogate.1 88
The term "risk" does not adequately describe the seriousness of the
possible harm. While injury is not an automatic consequence if the
surrogate mother smokes or drinks, safeguarding against possible harm
is a matter of acting or not acting. The realization that the affirmative act
of engaging in deleterious, or possibly deleterious, behavior could cause
injury, dictates that there is a duty of avoidance, whether expressly or
impliedly incorporated into the surrogate mother contract; the duty to
exercise due care in carrying the infant is a heightened one. Considering
the social value of the interest in protecting prenatal life, it is apparent
that the duty is paramount. Balancing the probability and gravity of the
damage that may occur to the fetus with the utility of possessing the
freedom to smoke, drink, ingest drugs, pursue a poor diet, and participate
in other harmful activities for nine months illustrates the absurdity of
not recognizing a duty of the surrogate mother to conform to a high
standard of due care towards the fetus. Giving a woman the right to
decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy does not mean that she
has a right to create a defective offspring.' 8 9 If it can be conceded that
once a pregnant woman has "abandoned her unfettered right to abort"
and and subsequently decides to continue her pregnancy, thereby incur-
ring a "conditional prospective liability,"'190 logic dictates the recognition
of a duty by the surrogate mother to conduct herself in a manner
consistent with the moral fabric of society, the expectations of the
86 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, § 31, at 170.
18? Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1927).
's See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, § 31, at 170 (definition of risk).
19 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19 Shaw, supra note 129.
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contracting parents and, more importantly, the best interests of the
child. 191
No relationship is as vital to the essence of life as is the intimacy
between womb mother and developing fetus. To absolve the gestational
mother from liability for injuries caused by her negligent conduct or to
remain oblivious to the affirmative duty owed to the fetus by the very
nature of its dependency on the surrogate would obliterate the meaning
of justice deemed intrinsic in the law of torts.
2. Breach
Negligence is defined as:
the failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly
demand. It embraces wilfull as well as unintentional disregard of
duty. It is not a term of fixed and measured meaning. It takes its
content always from specific circumstances, and its meaning
varies as the context of surrounding circumstances change.19
2
In the surrogate motherhood arrangement, once duty has been estab-
lished, a breach of that duty is readily observable. When a surrogate
191 By the same token, if the surrogate's physician advised the surrogate mother of
defects in the developing fetus and the surrogate mother failed to abort, the child should be
able to maintain an action for failing to abort. If the contract provided that the surrogate
abort in the event the physician detected physical deformities, a duty would be imposed on
the surrogate mother to abort. Since the surrogate mother entered into the contract
cognizant of possible ramifications and expectations, suit for recovery of monetary damages
should not present any problem even though the validity or enforceability of a surrogate
mother contract is still an issue. The breach of that duty would result in liability, attaching
either to the contracting parents or the child under the theory of third party beneficiary. See
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.5 (1982) (rights of beneficiaries). Absent express provisions
mandating abortion if defects are diagnosed, the duty to abort could be implied when viewed
against the contract in toto. However, constitutional issues permeate the questions of the
validity and enforceability of such contracts and whether recovery can be granted under
contract law. The constitutional implications, however, are beyond the scope of this Note.
Discussions of the constitutionality of surrogate mother contracts can be found in Black,
supra note 106, at 387-92; Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and
Possibilities, 15 UCLA L. REv. 480, 485-88 (1968); Rushevsky, supra note 106, at 110-13;
Comment, The Surrogate Child: Legal Issues and Implications for the Future, 7 J. Juv. L. 80,
85-88 (1983).
Recovery under tort law may not be as complicated. A suit by the child alleging that the
surrogate mother breached her duty in nurturing a healthy fetus is, in reality, a suit for
wrongful life. To date, only two states allow wrongful life claims. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.
3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Call v. Kezirian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 185
Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1980); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (en
bane). See supra note 15 for a list of law review articles that discuss wrongful life claims.
..2 People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 441 Ill. 618, 624, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952).
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mother, after being fully apprised of the import of her responsibilities to
the contracting parents and to the fetus, fails to abstain from tobacco
smoking, drug ingestion, alcohol consumption, or to adhere to a proper
nutritional diet, her conduct will have culminated in a breach of the duty
owed to the fetus. Breach of that duty results from the surrogate's
unreasonable conduct in exercising an improper course of prenatal care.
Her digression from due care results in culpability greater than ordinary
negligence. The surrogate's behavior should have regarded as reckless,
defined as follows:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which
it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only
that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that
which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.193
Whether defined in terms of ordinary negligence or recklessness,
pursuing a course of conduct known by the surrogate mother to be laden
with risk cannot be excused. Moreover, a certain store of knowledge must
be imputed to the surrogate mother, should she demonstrate an absence
of appreciation for her role in carrying another couple's child.1 94
Upon a showing of negligent or reckless conduct, an elaborate assess-
ment of the surrogate's breach of duty is unnecessary, other than to
ascertain the causal link between the damage and the negligent act. Only
after sufficient evidence has been presented to demonstrate the causal
relation between the damage and the negligence may the court then
allow recovery for the plaintiff-infant.
3. Causation
Medical assistance has proven itself to be an asset for injured plaintiffs
in their prayers for relief. This fact is especially true in cases involving
prenatal injuries. 195 Although proof may be difficult, courts have chosen
to rely on a causation test to determine if the injury sustained is traceable
193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
"' See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, §32, at 185 (presumed level of knowledge
discussed).
195 E.g., Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 272, 164 A.2d 93, 95 (1960). Speculative
questions about causation still arise, however. Compare Sinkler, 401 Pa. at 267, 164 A.2d at
93 (allowing plaintiff to trace the injury to the wrongful act) with Puhl v. Milwaukee
Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (determining plaintiff was unable
to meet her burden of proof). An informative discussion about the causation issue in
prenatal injury claims can be found in Lintgen, supra note 69, at 554.
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to another's wrongful act. 196 While the legal cause need not be the sole or
predominant cause of injury,197 it is necessary that the actor's conduct be
a substantial or material factor causing the injury. 198 A tort claim for
prenatal injury where the action is instituted against the surrogate
mother does not pose extraordinary causation problems. The tests em-
ployed are identical to those utilized in the typical prenatal injury cases;
the difference lies only in the identity of the defendant.
The health and well-being of the fetus is, for the most part, dependent
upon the surrogate mother. When it can be demonstrated that the
surrogate's drug ingestion, tobacco smoking, alcohol consumption, or
improper diet caused the resultant damage, liability will be extended to
her. As in many prenatal tort claims, instances will occur where the
injury cannot successfully be traced to the unreasonable conduct. For"
example, causation may be difficult to establish when the surrogate
mother smokes only a few cigarettes or consumes a minimal to moderate
amount of alcohol. The miniscule intake of tobacco smoke or alcohol could
have been the causal element responsible for the injury but the medical
evidence linking these given quantities is inconclusive, lending itself to
speculation and conjecture. As long as competent medical evidence
establishes the causal relation and damage to the child, recovery will be
allowed.' 99
Asserting a cause of action seeking recovery for prenatal injury
deserves recognition equal to a claim for property rights by an unborn
child. 200 Refusal based on the identity of the negligent actor is abhorrent
to the senses of justice, fairness, and logic. Lack of precedent or recogni-
tion of antiquated rules should not prevent the formation of law condu-
cive to changing times. "When these ghosts of the past stand in the path
of justice clinking their medieval chains, the proper course for the judge
is to pass through them undeterred."201
4. Damages
Proof of damage is an essential element of the child's case. The amount
of recovery is directly related to the severity of the injury caused by the
'9 E g., Day v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 comment d (1965); James & Perry, Legal Cause,
60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951).
198 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, § 41, at 267; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 431 (1965). This situation is not to be mistaken as an application of the "but for" test.
While causation-in-fact is essential to liability, liability based on causation in fact would
open a Pandora's box, holding the surrogate mother responsible for results beyond her
control.
199 E.g., Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 351, 102 N.E.2d 691, 692 (1951).
2o E.g., Day, 328 So. 2d at 562.
201 Woods, 303 NY at 355, 102 N.E.2d at 694 (quoting Lord Atkin in United Australia,
Ltd. v. Barclay's Bank, Ltd., 1941 A C. 1, 29).
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surrogate mother's negligent conduct. In addition to compensatory dam-
ages, the injured child should be able to recover both nominal damages,
to vindicate his rights, and punitive damages, as a form of punishment,
exemplifying the legal consequences of neglecting the affirmative duty
intrinsic in surrogate mothering.
V. THE REASONABLY PRUDENT EXPECTANT SURROGATE: A SUGGESTED
STANDARD OF CARE
The legal creation of the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" has
given flexibility to the determination of tort liability.20 2 The conduct of
the reasonable man varies with the situation that confronts him. The
reasonableness standard takes into account, among other characteristics,
the physical attributes of the actor and the degree of knowledge, skill,
and intelligence required under the circumstances. The gist of the
standard is that the actor should conduct himself with that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by a reasonable, prudent man of like characteristics,
under similar circumstances. 20
3
Surrogate mothering and the concomitant legal complexities which
may inevitably surface provide a firm foundation on which to create a
new standard of liability, fashioned around the reasonable person stan-
dard. Presently, no established standard applies solely to cases in which
parents negligently injure their children; some commentators 2° 4 and
three courts205 have suggested such a standard.
Utilizing a "reasonably prudent expectant surrogate" standard would
permit a case-by-case determination of liability rather than categorizing
classes of tort actions regardless of negligent conduct. The surrogate
mother would be held to a standard of reasonableness, irrespective of the
specific nature of these acts. An examination of the qualities possessed by
the reasonably prudent expectant surrogate is vital to understand how
the standard will be applied when courts are initially confronted with
this unique tort claim. Moreover, the use of this carefully fashioned
202 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 15, § 32, at 173-75 (description of the
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence").
203 See, e.g., Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938) (reasonable professional);
Hill v. City of Glenwood, 124 Iowa 479, 100 N.W. 522 (1904) (reasonable blind person); Roth
v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525, 43 P. 641 (1896) (reasonably careful child of same age,
intelligence, maturity, training and experience).
204 Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoas. 47, 85 (1978);
Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 582, 606 (1976); Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to
Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795 (1976).
20' Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal- Rptr. 288 (1971); Grodin v.
Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980); Miller v. Leljedal, 71 Pa. Commw. 372,
455 A.2d 256 (1983).
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standard of care would achieve the most equitable outcome in an area
which is both unprecedented and unfamiliar to the courts and to the legal
profession in general.
A. Moral Qualities
Negligence and morality are not inseparable elements in defining the
limits of acceptable behavior. "The standard man evaluates interests in
accordance with the valuation placed upon them by the community
sentiment crystallized into law. '20 6 The "standard man" is not absolved of
liability if his values are incongruent with those of the community; he
also is not exempted from liability if he believes that his values are in
accord with those of the community. 20 7 Although surrogate motherhood
may raise a few eyebrows, the moral qualities of this undertaking cannot
be ignored. The factors which determine the community's values with
respect to surrogate motherhood include the role that the surrogate
mother plays in prenatal development and the right of the child to begin
life with a sound mind and body. Incorporated into the community's value
system is the protection of its children, living and unborn. Placing the
future of an unborn child into the hands of a virtual stranger mandates
that the standard of the surrogate's conduct be elevated, despite the value
the surrogate may place upon her role. Her conduct must conform with
the reasonable standard of due care that the community views as
consistent with its underlying moral fabric.
B. Intelligence
An objective standard of reasonableness is also applied with respect to
intelligence. A claim that the defendant acted in the best fashion she
knew is insufficient. As stated in Vaughan v. Menlove,
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence
should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual,
which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each
individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires
in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary
prudence would observe. 208
Encompassed in the analysis of intelligence is the actor's ability to
estimate the effects of his acts when viewed against existing factors. 209 It
seems reasonable to conclude that the average prudent person would
know the consequences of an expectant woman's indulgence in cigarettes,
20. Seavy, supra note 187, at 10.
207 Id.
208 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 475, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837).
201 Seavy, supra note 187, at 12.
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alcohol, drugs, or poor nutritional habits. An even more reasonable
conclusion is that a woman serving as a surrogate mother possesses the
ability to estimate the effects of inadequate prenatal care. A major factor
to be incorporated into the reasonably prudent expectant surrogate
standard is an objective requisite level of intelligence presumed to be
possessed by the surrogate-that is, knowing that drug ingestion, alcohol
consumption, tobacco smoking, and poor diet involve considerable risk to
the developing fetus. This factor is especially true in light of her
involvement with the surrogate motherhood clinic, or hospital, and the
contracting parents.2 10
C. Physical Characteristics
The standard person would be identical to an expectant surrogate. The
surrogate mother must conduct herself as the reasonable person would
conduct herself if pregnant. The added ingredient to this assumption of
like physical characteristics 211 is that the child is being carried for
another couple. This factor presupposes a special duty to the unborn
child-an elevated standard of care to ensure the child's continuing
health and well-being. 2 12 A reasonably prudent expectant surrogate
would abstain from harmful acts during pregnancy. The only demands
placed upon an expectant surrogate relate to the precautions the surro-
gate mother must take to compensate for the restrictions placed upon her
by reason of the pregnancy. Thus, the reasonably prudent expectant
surrogate takes into account the limitations placed upon her acts while
carrying the infant; conduct which defies these limitations is clearly
unreasonable.
D. Belief and Knowledge
The belief and knowledge of the actor do not determine if his conduct
was negligent. In light of the existing facts surrounding the situation, the
actor's belief that he was using reasonable care is immaterial.213 More-
over, it is conceded that all persons do not possess the identical store of
21o The surrogate mother will generally be fully apprised of the surrogate mothering
process, its requirements regarding prenatal care, and possible risks posed by her conduct.
1 1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C comments a & c (actor to conform to
standard of reasonable person of similar physical characteristics). An objective test is
applied to determine negligence; the mental and emotional characteristics of the allegedly
negligent surrogate mother are immaterial. "The law takes no account of the infinite
variety of temperament, intellect and education which make the internal character of a
given act so different in different men." 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 202-17.
2 " Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964).
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knowledge. 214 Liability is not premised on the actor's lack of requisite
knowledge, but because he failed to acquire that knowledge. 21 5 In the
surrogate mother situation, the woman who claims she was not aware of
the consequences of smoking, drinking or other harmful acts is not
excused from liability. This knowledge is expected of an actor in the
surrogate mother's position, whether or not expressly provided in the
surrogate motherhood contract or imputed to her by reason of her
undertaking. The surrogate exhibits negligent behavior by failing to
acquire the knowledge which is an essential part of her task as
surrogate mother. More importantly, "[wo]men who engage in certain
activities or come into certain relationships with people or things are
under peculiar obligation to acquire knowledge and experience about
that activity, person, or thing."2 16 Undoubtedly the surrogate mother is
under a "peculiar obligation to acquire knowledge" about the expecta-
tions of her role as a surrogate and the risks involved should she engage
in harmful activities. Under this suggested standard, the surrogate
mother is obligated to possess superior knowledge about the effects of her
behavior on the developing fetus and to understand that her conduct will
be deemed unreasonable if she deviates from the accepted course of
prenatal care.
This suggested standard, however, does not disregard the power vested
in the expectant surrogate mother by virtue of her position. It takes into
consideration that parents are sometimes forgetful or careless; the
standard retains enough elasticity to afford latitude for error. 217 The
benefit of the reasonably prudent expectant surrogate standard is its
ability to allow the child redress for injuries sustained via the negligent
acts of the surrogate mother while at the same time protecting the
surrogate's discretion.
In light of the increasingly rapid reliance on the new reproductive
technologies, the reasonably prudent expectant surrogate standard would
balance the interests of both the surrogate mother and the child who is
beginning its new life through the miraculous marriage of medical
science and the natural physiology.
VI. CONCLUSION
A growing number of childless couples have resorted to the assistance
of scientifically-controlled reproductive technologies. The future looks
214 See Seavy, supra note 187, at 18, for an account of the reasons explaining the absence
of a standard of knowledge.
215 Id. at 18.
"' James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1, 12
(1951) (emphasis added).
217 Arguing that the application of such a standard would usurp the parents' ability to
exercise discretion in raising and disciplining their children merits little, if any, weight
since the discretion will be a factor in the jury's determination of negligence.
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especially promising for couples who desire offspring through the use of
surrogate motherhood. The utilization of surrogate mother arrangements
will undoubtedly generate a new stream of tort liability actions. In light
of the recognition of prenatal injury claims and the inapplicability of
parent-child immunity, courts may be confronted with a tort action by a
child who has sustained prenatal injuries as a result of the surrogate
mother's negligent prenatal care.
Recovery in such a case would be justified on the basis that the
surrogate mother assumed a momentous and devout duty to the child.
This duty to abstain from harmful prenatal conduct emanates from the
surrogate's relationship to the unborn child. The surrogate assumes the
position of a third party, thereby holding herself liable for damages
proximately caused by her negligent acts. The surrogate mother, how-
ever, should be held to a heightened standard of care; not only is she
cognizant of the risks involved if she indulges in harmful conduct, but she
is vested with the sole responsibility of ensuring, to the best of her ability,
the fetus' continuing good health and well-being. The contract into which
she entered merely evidences the nature of her role. Whether the
prohibitions against tobacco smoking, drug ingestion, alcohol consump-
tion, or adherence to an improper diet are express conditions of the
contract or implied conditions of the surrogate mother's role, her failure
to abstain from these prenatal vices constitutes a duty whose breach
could cause grave physical and mental injuries.
With the advances and aid of medical science, the demonstration of the
causal relationship between the prenatal injuries and the surrogate
mother's negligence does not present any unique obstacles not present in
other prenatal injury cases. In addition, the identity of the negligent
actor should not pose a threat to the redress afforded to an infant who
must endure life with permanent damage-damage caused by an indi-
vidual who will not participate in raising and educating the child.
Recovery will neither cure an ailment nor perfect an anomoly; however,
compensation is the sole means by which society may pay reverence to
the value of life and show compassion to an innocent child who must pay
the price for the negligence of another. To deny recovery is to denyjustice.
The most justiciably manageable manner by which to adjudge these
cases is the- creation of a new reasonableness standard specifically
designed to determine negligence in these circumstances. A reasonably
prudent expectant surrogate standard would presume a superior level of
knowledge by the surrogate mother. This store of knowledge would
include that knowledge possessed by an actor of like characteristics,
acting under like circumstances. The surrogate mother would be required
to know that poor nutrition, tobacco smoking, alcohol consumption, and
drug ingestion involve substantial risk to the welfare of the fetus and
that behavior contrary to that expected of an identical pregnant actor in
the community is unreasonable. The surrogate's belief in the nature of
her acts is immaterial, as are her emotional and mental characteristics.
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The strength of the reasonably prudent expectant surrogate standard is
its ability to permit a case-by-case determination of negligence. The
standard would permit the child redress for prenatal injuries caused by
the surrogate mother's negligent conduct while maintaining the degree of
discretion inherent in the surrogate mother's role in the relationship.
Recognition of this new tort liability and the application of the
reasonably prudent expectant surrogate standard do not alleviate all of
the problems which may accompany surrogate motherhood. They do,
however, reflect society's concern for the value of health and life, and
attempt to compensate injured children in order to help relieve the
burdens they must endure.
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